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Abstract This is a report on the 3-day workshop
“The Neuroscience of Responsibility” that was held
in the Philosophy Department at Delft University of
Technology in The Netherlands during February
11th–13th, 2010. The workshop had 25 participants
from The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, UK, USA,
Canada and Australia, with expertise in philosophy,
neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry and law. Its
aim was to identify current trends in neurolaw
research related specifically to the topic of respon-
sibility, and to foster international collaborative
research on this topic. The workshop agenda was
constructed by the participants at the start of each
day by surveying the topics of greatest interest and
relevance to participants. In what follows, we
summarize (1) the questions which participants
identified as most important for future research in
this field, (2) the most prominent themes that
emerged from the discussions, and (3) the two
main international collaborative research project
plans that came out of this meeting.
Research Questions
Questions identified by participants as important for
future research fell roughly into five groups (groups I,
II and III were summarized as indicated, and some
(indicated with *) fell into more than one category):
(I) CONCEPTUAL ISSUES REGARDING
RESPONSIBILITY ASSESSMENT
• Will neuroscience lead us to alter the categories used to assess
responsibility?
• To what extent does neuroscience put pressure on folk
psychological categories in law?
• What is neuroscience able to reveal that might assist in
defining and determining criminal responsibility?
• Can neuroscience provide models for a new conceptualization
of criminal responsibility?
• What light is shed on the concept of the legal individual by
neuroscience?
• How can neuroscience contribute to legal regulation of
responsibility and decision making in terms of emotion, brain
differences, dysfunctions and damage?
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• What novel challenges are posed by neuroscience, versus
other sciences, in criminal responsibility assessments?
• Can neuroscience help us to identify control mechanisms in
the brain?
• What does neuroscience tell us about the existence of
responsibility?
• What are the findings and predictions of addiction
neuroscience? ***
SUMMARY QUESTION: Will the findings of neuroscience lead us to
alter the categories and methods used to assess responsibility?
(II) BRAIN INTERVENTIONS AND INTERFACING
• (How) can neuroscientific techniques help us to restore and/or
enhance responsibility?
• Is it possible to enhance eye witness memory? *
• What are the implications of brain-computer interfaces for
responsibility?
• What are the ethical and legal implications of brain-machine
interfaces?
• What is the responsibility of the doctor and the treated person
(before and after treatment)?
• Can neuromodulation be used to suppress the ability to deceive? **
• What are the findings and predictions of addiction
neuroscience? ***
SUMMARY QUESTION: How do brain interventions affect people’s
responsibility?
(III) PREDICTION DANGEROUSNESS AND RISK
ASSESSMENT
• What are the moral and legal implications of biomarker
identification?
• How does the availability of predictive information influence
the validity of predictions?
• What are the findings and predictions of addiction
neuroscience? ***
SUMMARY QUESTION: What does neuroscience add to current
methods of behavioural prediction and treatment, and what are
the implications for privacy?
(IV) MEMORY
• What kinds of memories are relevant in the law, and how can
neuroscience help us to identify them (their presence and quality)?
• Is it possible to enhance eye witness’ memory? *
• Can neuromodulation be used to suppress the ability to deceive? **
(V) IMPACT OF NEUROSCIENCE IN DIFFERENT LEGAL
JURISDICTIONS
• How has neuroscience affected various legal jurisdictions?
Prominent Themes
An especially-prominent role was played in the
discussions by the concepts of capacity, character
and competence, and participants also identified a
useful list of forensic applications for neuroscience.
Capacity Much of the discussion, especially of topics
(I) and (II), presupposed some version of the capaci-
tarian position—i.e. that the degree of a person’s
responsibility for what they have done depends in part
on that person’s mental capacities. The capacities that
were initially mentioned in discussion were the folk
psychological cognitive and volitional capacities—i.e.
“the ability to understand what conduct legal rules or
morality require, to deliberate and reach decisions
concerning those requirements, and to conform to
decisions when made” ([1]:227). However, subsequent
discussion also noted that an important role seems to
be played by affective capacities and by people’s
values. The suggestion that affective capacities play
an important role—i.e. that people’s responsibility may
also be undermined when they lack the capacity to
have the right emotional responses to certain things—
is familiar from the moral cognition literature (e.g. [2]).
However, the suggestion that values also play a role
here—i.e. that people’s responsibility may also be
undermined if they either harbour values which are
generally considered deviant and problematic, or if they
fail to value things that are commonly appreciated—is
probably most closely related to something like the
“sane deep self” view described by [3].
Character Discussion of topics (I), (II) and (III) also
revealed the uneasy distinction between the notion of
capacity (see above) and the notion of character—the
chief question here being whether some capacity
deficits (for instance, a lack of capacity to control
one’s anger) might be equally well re-described as
character flaws, and if so then what effect this might
have on responsibility assessments. The significance
of this, as discussed recently by [4, 5] among others,
is that while on the capacitarian stance capacity
deficits are usually thought of as potentially legitimate
grounds for (partial) excuse, character flaws do not
normally excuse people. Hence, there is urgent need
for research into whether there is a valid conceptual
and/or empirical basis for retaining the notion of
character.
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Competence At various junctures participants also
noted the similarities and differences between the
above-mentioned legal notion of capacity, and the
notion of competence which is usually more readily
associated with discussions in the medical context.
For instance, many of the cognitive capacities that are
required for full legal responsibility also seem to be
required by patients in medical contexts; however, an
important difference is that the threshold for having
sufficient capacity in the legal context is higher than
the threshold in the medical context. It was suggested
that this is probably due to the fact that in the medical
context competence is required for the patient to make
self-regarding decisions (e.g. about treatment, or end-
of-life decisions), whereas in the legal context an
assessment that a defendant has sufficient capacity
will have ramifications for other-regarding decisions
(e.g. the state may then put the defendant on trial or
punish them).
Forensic applications for neuroscience The partici-
pants also identified several specific uses for neuro-
technology in the legal context: capacity assessments,
general competence assessments and assessments
specifically targeted at decision in the end-of-life
context, pain assessment, bias assessment, risk as-
sessment, propensity assessment, deception detection,
memory enhancement and treatments for various
mental capacity impairments.
Discussion
The above set of research questions is quite varied, and
the prominent themes are rather inclusive. But, upon
reflection, it seems that in order to investigate how
research in cognitive neuroscience will affect human
self-understanding (conceptual issues) and human prac-
tice (risk assessment and impact on legal jurisdiction),
two general topics stand out as urgent. First of all, what
are the current possibilities for neuroscience to influ-
ence the restoration and enhancement of responsibility?
It is not uncommon that analyses of conceptual
implications of cognitive neuroscience expand into
discussions of far away future, if not futuristic
possibilities, or even pure thought experimentation.
Thus, it is helpful to focus on those neuroscientific
techniques which are already in use. For this reason, an
analysis of the impact of psychopharmaceuticals on
our understanding of what is meant by capacity, char-
acter and competence seems like a good starting point.
Secondly, what is the current practice in legal
contexts? How is neuroscientific evidence actually
used in practice within courtrooms and in legislation?
Also, neuroscientific information could play different
roles at different stages of the criminal process. For
instance, to what extent is e.g. brain finger printing
used in relation to questions concerning evidence
(was the suspect at the scene of the crime)? What role
does neuroscience play in establishing mens rea? This
question raises large philosophical issues about
freedom and efficacy of conscious will. More specific
questions can be raised in cases of behavior that is
significantly influenced by neuropharmaceuticals or
neurotechnologies (e.g. brain-computer interfaces,
deep brain stimulation, etc). Finally, to what extent
does neuroscience currently influence estimates of
accountability and actual sentencing decisions?
International Collaboration
Two international projects have been initiated in
recognition of the above two topics’ importance:
(A) NEUROSCIENCE IN EUROPEAN CASE-LAW AND
JUDICIAL PRACTICE. MAPPING THE FIELD.
• Although there is some indication in the current literature of the
kind and degree of impact of neuroscience on North American
case law and legislation in criminal, civil and medical contexts
(e.g. [6]), surprisingly little is known about the impact of
neuroscience on judicial practice beyond North America.
• Such information is needed to make legislative reform
recommendations, to keep track of novel uses for neuroscience
in legal contexts, and to shed light on the conceptual questions
raised at points (I) and (II) above.
• Hurdles that make it especially hard to assess the impact of
neuroscience on European law include: (1) language barriers,
(2) doctrinal differences between jurisdictions, and (3) lack of
international collaboration.
• Over the next few months, several workshop participants will
collaborate on putting together a research funding proposal that
will be submitted to the European Science Foundation in
October 2010.
• The proposed research will focus on surveying the actual and
current use of neuroscientific, behavioral genetic and neurogenetic
techniques before the European Courts and in investigative
activities; creating an appropriate case law retrieval and storage
system; and training judges in the field of neuroscience and the
law. Interested parties from beyond Europe are also welcome to
join this international project.
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• Prior to sumission, the research funding proposal will be
discussed at a mini-conference in Pavia-Milano.
Interested parties should email Prof. Amedeo Santosuosso:
amedeo.santosuosso@unipv.it
(B) PSYCHOPHARMACEUTICAL AND OTHER
METHODS FOR REDUCING, RESTORING AND
ENHANCING RESPONSIBILITY.
• Drug users’ autonomy, and thus their responsibility, is
sometimes thought to be reduced because of the coercive
effects of addiction.
• But drugs can also be used to positively influence our
cognitive functioning. For instance, alcohol can help to
overcome shyness; and antipsychotic medication can help to
restore people’s capacity to stand trial.
• More recently, some have suggested that if responsibility co-
varies with mental capacity, then maybe drugs that improve
cognition might also enhance responsibility.
• The broad aim of this project is to explore the conceptual and
empirical foundations of claims about how drugs (and perhaps
other neurotechnological interventions) can reduce, restore and
enhance responsibility in relation to character, capacity or
competence (see above).
• Expressions of interest are sought from researchers who are
conducting or planning empirical studies on the effects of
psychopharmaceuticals and other neurotechnologies on
responsibility-related mental functions.
• The aim is to set up an international research group to conduct
collaborative research and to hold conferences and workshops
on this topic.
• Funding will eventually be sought to support networking
activities as part of this international research.
Interested parties should email either Prof. Jeanette Kennett or
Dr. Nicole Vincent:
Jeanette.Kennett@mq.edu.au
n.a.vincent@tudelft.nl
Interested parties who were not present at the
workshop, but who would like to get involved in
these projects should contact the indicated people, or
for other information please contact the workshop
organizer Dr Nicole Vincent.
The workshop was funded by the 3TU Centre for
Ethics and Technology, it was organized by Dr Nicole
Vincent from the Philosophy Department at Delft
University of Technology, and further details (e.g. a
list of participants) can be obtained from the event
web page: http://neuroethics.eventbrite.com/
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